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National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health re­
searchers conducted a study to investigate the human response 
issues related to wearing a self-contained self-rescuer (SCSR). 
The goal was to develop training to educate miners on what 
they could expect from their units during an escape. Subjects 
included miners who had experience wearing SCSRs, manu­
facturers, and researchers. Results identified nine key areas 
of concern: (1) starting the unit, (2) unit heat, (3) induction 
of coughing, (4) unit taste, (5) difficulty in breathing while 
wearing the unit, (6) quality of the air supplied, (7) nose 
clips, (8) goggles, and (9) the behavior of the breathing bag. 
In addition, researchers reviewed the literature on human 
response under duress. This article describes the expectations 
training program, which comprises the findings of the SCSR 
study and what is known about the normal human response in 
an emergency. The authors present background on SCSRs and 
the SCSR switchover procedure mandated in the recent federal 
Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006, 
which provided the impetus for the expectations training. 
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INTRODUCTION 
S elf-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs) provide the wearer with a 1-hr oxygen supply as mandated by U.S. govern­
ment regulations. SCSRs were developed in the late 1970s 
and deployed in U.S. mines in the early 1980s for use by 
coal miners during emergencies, such as fires, explosions, or 
gas inundations in which the ambient atmosphere becomes 
toxic. As their name implies, SCSRs are meant to serve one 
purpose—to allow a miner to self-rescue by escaping the mine. 
They are not intended to be used for other purposes, such as fire 
fighting. As with other oxygen-supplying apparatuses such as 
the closed-circuit breathing units worn by mine rescue teams, 
SCSRs are fairly complex devices and thus require detailed 
analysis. 
There are two types of SCSRs produced and sold. Both are 
closed-circuit breathing apparatuses; that is, the units do not 
exhaust CO2 but remove it from the breathing circuit internally. 
One type of SCSR stores O2 as a compressed gas and uses 
a chemical bed of lithium hydroxide (LiOH) to absorb CO2 
as the miner exhales. It is started by opening a valve on the 
oxygen cylinder that fills a breathing bag. The other type uses 
potassium superoxide (KO2, a solid chemical that reacts with 
moisture in the breath) to generate O2, with LiOH used to 
remove much of the CO2 from the breathing circuit. 
This study focused on the problematic use of SCSRs by 
miners who attempted to escape the Wolf Run Mining Com­
pany’s Sago Mine in West Virginia following an explosion. 
The particular SCSR used by miners at the Sago Mine was 
a combination unit in terms of providing oxygen. The initial 
oxygen is provided by a small compressed oxygen cylinder 
that yields 7 to 8 liters of oxygen. When the oxygen cylinder is 
activated, the wearer receives an initial supply of oxygen that 
is sufficient until the potassium superoxide begins to generate 
oxygen. If the oxygen cylinder fails, the device can be “cold 
started” by the miner expelling several breaths to inflate the 
breathing bag. A SCSR’s complexity requires some level of 
training by miners to ensure correct use. Figure 1 depicts 
miners wearing compressed oxygen SCSRs during a mock 
escape drill. Federal mining regulations require that every 
person entering an underground coal mine in the United States 
has to be furnished with an SCSR.(1) 
In 1981, SCSR devices were introduced into U.S. mines. 
Although much time, effort, and money had gone into the 
development of these engineered devices, very little effort was 
spent in teaching people how to use them. More recently, self-
rescuer training was included as one of several mandatory 
courses in Title 30 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 48 
and 75.(1) Specifically, SCSR training was implemented into 
the broader, required course on self-rescue and respiratory 
devices, such as respirators. However, this course was one of 
12 covered during a single 8-hr day. It called for instruction and 
demonstration in the use, care, and maintenance of self-rescue
    
and respiratory devices employed at the mine. Thus, training 
consisted of a short demonstration of the donning procedure 
once a year. Few miners ever had the opportunity to actually 
put on an apparatus and see what it felt like to use one. Further, 
miners had no notion of what to expect when wearing the SCSR 
in an escape situation. 
FIGURE 1. Miners wearing compressed oxygen SCSRs during 
a simulated escape 
BACKGROUND 
I n 2006, several major incidents occurred at underground coal mines in the United States, resulting in 19 worker 
fatalities. These included a fire at the Aracoma Coal Company, 
Inc., Alma No. 1 Mine in West Virginia, in which 2 miners died; 
an explosion at the Kentucky Darby Coal Company Darby No. 
1 Mine, where 5 miners died; and the explosion at the Sago 
Mine in which 12 miners died. For illustrative purposes, the 
authors focus here on the Sago disaster because of the number 
of fatalities and the relevance of SCSRs to this case. 
On Monday, January 2, 2006, at approximately 6:30 a.m., 
an explosion occurred at the Sago Mine, leading to the death of 
12 miners. Thirteen miners were working in the vicinity of the 
explosion. Twelve were members of a coal production crew. 
Of this group, 11 of the 12 perished from carbon monoxide 
poisoning. The thirteenth miner was working alone about 
1500 feet from the other 12; he was killed by the force of the 
explosion. The sole survivor of the production crew was able 
to give testimony in the ensuing investigations conducted by 
the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA)(2) and the 
West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training 
(OMHST).(3) The survivor devoted many of his statements 
to the functioning of the crew’s SCSRs, the type that uses 
potassium superoxide to generate oxygen. This article is based 
on the OMHST Report of Investigation, which is rich in detail 
and devotes an entire section to SCSR use. When appropriate, 
verbatim quotes are given to represent exact detail from this 
report. As might be expected, there are some inconsistencies 
in the testimony, so the authors present both sides of the issue 
when apparent contradictions occur. 
Following the explosion, the crew started out of the mine on 
their track-mounted personnel carrier. They soon encountered 
debris on the track that made it impassable. The crew then 
entered their primary escapeway, a tunnel that could lead them 
out of the mine. They walked approximately 305 m (1000 ft) 
through a potentially deadly atmosphere before donning their 
SCSRs. “While it is unclear the location at which the self-
rescuers were donned, [the survivor] stated that the attempt to 
walk out was aborted by the section foreman because three of 
the twelve rescuers were not functioning.”(3) At another point 
in the report, however, there is a different interpretation of the 
attempt to walk out of the mine: “Finding their way blocked 
by smoke and debris, the crew was forced to return to [their 
workplace], gathering materials to build a barricade as they 
went.” What is not at issue in either statement is the fact that 
three individuals were convinced that their SCSRs were not 
working. 
Once back in their workplace, the crew began to erect a 
barricade of plastic sheeting that would provide some protec­
tion from the smoke and, they hoped, from carbon monoxide. 
The miners took off their SCSRs while they were building 
the barricade.(3) After the barricade was finished, all 12 men 
went behind it to wait for rescue teams to arrive. The survivor 
reported that there were not enough SCSRs to go around, since 
after a time, four miners were not able to make theirs work. 
Individuals shared with each other, trading off SCSRs between 
them. Besides removing and replacing mouthpieces while 
sharing the apparatuses, members of the crew also removed 
their mouthpieces to talk. The OMHST Report of Investigation 
concluded that “The cumulative exposure to carbon monoxide 
before, during, and after their SCSRs apparently stopped 
producing oxygen exposed the individuals to levels that were 
fatal.” 
It is extremely unlikely that 4 of the 12 devices would 
malfunction (three initially and the fourth later). All models of 
SCSRs on the market undergo extensive and rigid laboratory 
testing prior to being certified for use in underground mines. 
Title 42 CFR Part 84 charges NIOSH and MSHA with jointly 
reviewing and issuing certifications for respirators used for 
mine emergencies and mine rescue, including SCSRs. Title 
42 CFR Part 84 also delineates minimum design criteria for 
apparatus, testing criteria for apparatus, and other provisions. 
Within NIOSH, the National Personal Protective Technology 
Laboratory (NPPTL) in Pittsburgh, Pa., is responsible for 
evaluating and certifying SCSRs for use in underground 
mines. NPPTL has extensive protocols in place for testing and 
certification of respiratory devices including SCSRs. 
Twelve SCSRs were recovered from behind the barricade 
at Sago; after which, “MSHA took custody of the SCSRs and 
placed them in sealed plastic bags for transfer to NIOSH’s 
National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory [NPPTL]
in Bruceton, PA.”(3) Investigators at the NPPTL evaluated all 
12 recovered units, concluding that “All had been deployed and 
examination of the chemicals inside the canisters indicated that 
they all had started producing oxygen.” None of the SCSRs, 
however, had been used to anywhere near full capacity. In fact, 
the average amount of potassium superoxide spent was only 
38.2%. The SCSRs of the three victims who the survivor stated 
wore malfunctioning units initially had produced as much O2 
as the others, and one showed evidence of moisture in the 
canister. 
Because of the way SCSRs were handled during the building 
of the barricade, it is apparent that they were not used correctly, 
at least not in that instance. Lack of knowledge of how the 
devices work may have had something to do with their misuse, 
especially if the miners took the mouthpieces out or shared 
the devices as reported by the surviving miner. In turn, this 
may have led to CO poisoning, which would have affected 
the miners’ reasoning and decision-making abilities, leading 
to further misuse of the SCSRs. 
The OMHST report(3) detailed some of the complex charac­
teristics of the chemical-oxygen unit that workers need to know 
but typically do not. First, cold starting the device may entail a 
considerable amount of time. It can take as long as 7 min for the 
apparatus to build up to 19.5% oxygen, which is reason enough, 
from a trapped miner’s point of view, to think the unit is not 
working. Thus, when the survivor tried to cold start his buddy’s 
SCSR at one point during the disaster, he might not have given it 
enough time. Second, breathing hard and rapidly moves more 
carbon dioxide and moisture through the canister. Trying to 
push or pull a greater volume of air through the chemical 
bed than it was designed to handle will generate breathing 
resistance. As noted earlier, miners might then remove their 
units to seek more breathing comfort, which is what happened 
when the crew members were building their barricade. Third, 
while the chemical reaction is progressing, it is generating 
heat, which keeps the KO2 in a molten state. If the wearer 
removes the SCSR for a few minutes, as the victims did with 
theirs, the canister cools and the KO2 solidifies. Once solid, the 
KO2 forms a hard coating around the potassium superoxide, 
making it very difficult to restart the device. The result could 
be an SCSR with only a small portion of the potassium 
superoxide expended, as in the units recovered from behind the 
barricade. 
In response to the mining incidents of 2006, on December 8 
of that year, MSHA promulgated a new rule on emergency mine 
evacuation. The rule states: “MSHA is concerned that miners 
may not be able to recognize when an SCSR is functioning 
properly. This may have caused miners to remove their SCSRs 
prematurely, thinking that the device was not working when 
breathing became difficult. Also, miners need the skills and 
knowledge to initiate (cold start) an SCSR if it fails to start 
automatically after the starting sequence is initiated.”(4) 
At MSHA’s request, NIOSH developed expectations train­
ing that will address the above concerns. The present study 
was conducted to determine problems and issues that miners 
and investigators have voiced based on past experience. 
Basic human responses under duress have been reviewed and 
included in the training. The expectations training focused on 
what miners could expect from their SCSR, as well as what 
to expect from themselves and others in an escape situation. 
For this article, the authors define expectations training as 
training that provides the trainees with sufficient physical, 
cognitive, psychological, and behavioral information (beyond 
the necessary technical information and hands-on experience) 
to allow them to understand any potential symptoms they might 
experience while performing a task or action. 
Earlier Studies 
Although there have been few studies regarding how to 
teach miners what to expect when using SCSRs, the notion 
that there ought to be expectations training for miners has been 
discussed for years. The fact that miners need to be educated 
about how the devices perform and what to expect from them­
selves when under duress is borne out in NIOSH interviews 
with 48 miners who escaped fires at three underground coal 
mine operations in western Pennsylvania in 1988 and 1990. 
As an example, from the miners’ comments, a majority of 
them were unaware that (1) there is breathing resistance when 
SCSRs are used, and (2) this resistance increases the longer 
the apparatus is worn. Consequently, when they encountered 
breathing resistance, the miners thought their SCSRs were not 
working properly. As a result, more than half of them either 
took their mouthpieces out or breathed around them while 
remaining in a potentially deadly atmosphere.(5–7) 
Accounts of incidents such as these have brought the reli­
ability of SCSRs into question among members of the mining 
community. Concern over a crisis of confidence that was not 
based on empirical data led the Joint Government, Labor, 
and Industry Task Group on Person Wearable Self-Contained 
Self-Rescuers to suggest that expectations training could be 
employed to restore miners’ confidence in the units. The task 
group devoted 12 pages to discussions of how to improve 
donning training and introduce expectations training. One 
observation particularly germane to this article came from an 
individual who noted that his company believes that one of the 
training objectives should be to educate the user regarding the 
kinds of stressors and performance expected from the SCSR. 
Whether lack of confidence played a part in the 2006 
tragedies, there have been numerous instances in which miners 
died, but subsequent laboratory tests established that their 
apparatus was not used up.(3,8) This presents a perplexing 
problem for investigators, one that has no easy answers. The 
Report of Investigation by MSHA into the Sago Mine disaster 
illustrates this point very well. 
Previous studies outside the mining industry have con­
cluded that individuals’ behavior and decision making is 
influenced by prior experiences and training.(9) In addition, 
other investigators have recommended that training on SCSRs 
should include mention of common complaints aired about the 
units.(10) 
A study evaluating test protocols for smoke divers work­
ing in the heat was conducted with nine male subjects 
(firefighters).(11) Firefighting activities involve strenuous phys­
ical work that is often performed in a hot and hostile 
environment with similarities to the exertion during escape 
under apparatus from a serious mine explosion and fire. It 
is known that the combination of physical activity, heavy 
clothing, and thermal stress results in increased physiological 
and psychological stress.(12) The study showed that strenuous 
smoke diving efforts at 130◦C produce greater thermal stress 
and result in a perception of greater effort than at lower 
temperatures. The stress is greater during longer tests, and the 
authors conclude that this may have implications for individual 
decision-making ability and the ability of workers to behave 
rationally with regard to their own safety and awareness of 
their limitations. 
Another study related the use of realistic previews to 
training outcomes.(13) The authors note that little attention 
has been given to how employee point of view relates to 
expectations, attitudes, or decisions in the selection of training 
programs. They examined two variables that could affect a 
worker’s entry into a training program: (1) the type of prior 
information offered about the program, and (2) the amount of 
freedom the worker had to take the program. Of interest to the 
present study was the type of prior information offered to the 
potential trainees. Trainees who received a realistic training 
preview were more likely to benefit from training and show 
commitment to their decision to attend the training; in addition, 
they were more motivated to learn. The authors conclude that 
it is becoming increasingly clear that understanding a trainee’s 
point of view is critical to attaining positive training outcomes 
and to the overall success of training interventions. 
Another interesting study looked into the effects of op­
timistic vs. realistic previews of training programs on self-
reported transfer of learning. Sixty-four participants were 
divided into two groups: one group received informative, 
optimistic previews of the training; the other group received 
a realistic (positive and negative) preview. Findings showed 
that the optimistic preview had more positive impact on 
expectations, motivation, learning, attitudes, and transfer of 
learning.(14) Thus, according to this study, previewing training 
in an optimistic, positive manner will result in higher moti­
vation and increased transfer of learning from the classroom 
to the workplace. It is important to note that this study was 
limited in that the subject sample was small; nevertheless, it 
raises a point to consider in training. 
METHOD 
T his study involved 11 male subjects: four miners (two of whom had worn SCSRs during an escape from 
an underground coal mine, and two others had extensive 
in-mine experience with the apparatus); CEO/presidents of 
three SCSR manufacturing companies; one general manager 
of safety and training from a major U.S. mining com­
pany; and three government researchers who had served 
as laboratory subjects in the testing of SCSRs. Subjects 
were informed that their participation was voluntary and 
anonymous. 
Each subject was interviewed in person or in a scheduled 
phone interview by the principal investigator—a research 
psychologist. Interviews lasted from 15 min to an hour. 
Subjects were asked questions about the human aspect of 
wearing an SCSR. The interview began with asking the subject 
to describe his history of experience wearing an SCSR. After 
understanding the subject’s background, open-ended questions 
were asked, such as: What was it like wearing the SCSR? 
Which unit did you wear, or have you worn? Subjects were 
prompted by the interviewer as appropriate: Did it have a 
taste? Did it have a smell? What did it feel like on your chest 
. . .  on your nose? What concerned you while wearing the unit? 
What should other miners know about how these units feel and 
perform? 
Responses were recorded by the assistant researcher as 
written notes that were later transcribed, compared with, 
and integrated with the research psychologist’s notes and 
observations. From this data, a list of issues regarding the 
wearing of the SCSRs was determined by analyzing individual 
interview responses. The individual issues were then compared 
with the responses of all interviewees to determine key 
issues and note consensus. NIOSH researchers also reviewed 
targeted psychological literature to determine important issues 
to include in relation to the expectations of self and others 
during escape.(15,16) 
Limitations of this study: This study may be viewed as 
limited due to the small number of subjects interviewed. The 
authors interviewed a variety of experienced subjects—miners, 
manufacturers, and researchers—to saturation, which refers to 
the point in a study when the researchers are hearing nothing 
new. The nine key areas of concern were confirmed many times 
by the subjects. 
RESULTS 
SCSRs 
It was noted that there are some differences between 
chemical-oxygen units and compressed oxygen units with 
respect to user expectations, emphasizing the importance for 
the miner to be trained on the specific unit used at his/her mine. 
There were nine key concerns resulting from the data analysis 
related to wearing an SCSR: 
1.	 Starting the unit. Miners must start all types of units 
by either pulling a cord or opening a valve. Chemical-
oxygen SCSRs may be cold started by the wearer 
exhaling into the unit until the bag is full. 
2.	 Heat. All units grow hot to the touch. SCSRs employ 
chemical beds that generate oxygen (using potassium 
superoxide) and/or scrub carbon dioxide (using lithium 
hydroxide) from exhaled air. The chemical reactions 
that take place during breathing generate heat. Thus, 
the miner may experience discomfort on his/her chest 
from the heat generated. It was suggested that miners 
use their clothing, a glove, or even an empty rock dust 
bag as protection between chest and unit. 
3.	 Induction of cough. Most units are packed with a dustlike 
substance (talc/cornstarch) to prevent the hoses from 
sticking together or to absorb saliva. The resultant 
coughing by the wearer may last a few minutes. Miners 
are advised not to remove the mouthpiece but to cough 
directly into the unit. Subjects stated doing that may 
produce a gag reflex. 
4.	 Taste. Miners have reported a variety of different 
tastes—from no taste to rubbery, bitter, metallic, or salty 
taste. A cornstarch taste was noted most frequently. 
5.	 Resistance to breathing. All SCSRs have some level 
of breathing resistance associated with them simply 
because of their design. The breathing hoses, due to their 
design and size, present initial resistance. Chemical-
oxygen units can be the most difficult to breathe 
through. As mentioned earlier, chemical-oxygen SCSRs 
use chemical beds to generate oxygen and/or to scrub 
carbon dioxide from exhaled air. As these chemical beds 
are gradually expended, there is less space for air to 
move through them, which causes breathing resistance 
to increase with time. Under normal circumstances the 
unit will continue to work as resistance builds up. Some 
miners have described that breathing through the units 
feels like breathing through a straw. 
6.	 Quality of breathed air. In  chemical-oxygen units the 
air is generally hot and dry. It may take a while for the 
chemical reaction to start. The harder the miner breathes, 
the greater the chemical reaction induced. Some subjects 
reported that their throat and tongue became dry, making 
it difficult to swallow. Compressed oxygen units were 
found to be hot and very humid. 
7.	 Nose clips. Subjects usually reported that the unit’s nose 
clips were uncomfortable, taking some time for wearers 
to get used to breathing through the mouth. Mouth 
breathing also may cause saliva to accumulate around 
the mouth. Excessive saliva may cause miners to remove 
the mouthpiece briefly to expel the saliva. Salvia can also 
enter the breathing circuit on chemical-oxygen units and 
accelerate the oxygen production process. 
8.	 The goggles. Goggles protect the eyes from smoke and 
toxic gases. Subjects reported that the goggles fog up or 
can fill with sweat, which is uncomfortable and makes 
it difficult to see. 
9.	 The bag. Bags on different units do not behave the same. 
It is important for miners to know how the bag functions 
on the specific unit they are using. 
Miners should understand that once the chemical-oxygen 
units are activated, the chemical reaction will produce more 
oxygen than the wearer needs. The excess oxygen will cause 
the breathing bag to fill up and overflow out the relief valve. 
For the SCSRs used by the Sago miners, the main chemical 
reaction begins 15 to 20 min after the unit is activated. Until the 
chemical reaction kicks in, the breathing bag will not be full. 
Miners must also understand that their oxygen demand may 
be higher than the amount produced by the SCSR. In this case, 
the miner is “outbreathing” the SCSR. An escaping miner must 
slow down his or her activity level to reduce their oxygen need. 
As long as the miner is able to inhale and exhale, the fullness 
of the bag is immaterial. Once all the oxygen is released by 
the chemical reaction, the breathing bag will get smaller and 
smaller until the miner can no longer take a breath. 
With compressed oxygen units, the volume of the breathing 
bag does not matter as long as there is pressurized oxygen in 
the cylinder. If more oxygen is needed than the constant flow 
provides, and the bag is emptied in the middle of a breath, the 
demand valve will open and pull what is needed directly from 
the cylinder. When the pressure gauge reads zero, the cylinder 
is empty. 
In all SCSRs, there may never be an outward sign such as 
bag inflation, relief valve operation, increased resistance, or 
high temperature to indicate the unit is working. If the miner 
can breathe while wearing the unit, then it is supplying oxygen 
and thus functioning. 
Psychological Response 
The review of literature on human response to emergencies 
provided the following advice to the miners as part of their 
expectations training. 
It is normal to experience an emotional reaction during 
an emergency escape. You are experiencing stress and likely 
what is sometimes referred to as the fight or flight response. 
This is the survival instinct that we are all born with; it 
prepares us to fight or run. This response prepares the 
body to help you in your escape. Psychologists call an 
incident like an emergency escape from a mine a “traumatic 
incident” and we know what some of the normal human 
reactions are to traumatic incidents. 
Responses to a traumatic incident include physical, 
mental, emotional, and behavioral changes. Remember that 
strong reactions and emotions are normal reactions in an 
extra-ordinary situation. Individuals are different and report 
any or all of the following symptoms: Rapid heartbeat, Dry 
mouth, Sweaty palms, Increased anxiety, Fear, Sweating 
profusely, Feeling confused, Feeling overwhelmed, Shal­
low breathing, Nausea, Disorientation. 
These are ordinary human responses to an extraordinary 
situation. 
What you can do. Be conscious of slowing your breath­
ing down. Walk at a steady pace. Stay with your buddy 
or crew. Watch out for each other. Think forward – think 
about getting out of the mine. Focus on the escape. Do not 
remove the mouthpiece to talk. Do not remove your unit 
until you are in fresh air or ready to switch to a new unit. 
Think forward. 
Walk at a steady pace. Stay calm. Regulate your 
breathing. 
At the beginning of this section, the authors noted nine 
characteristics of SCSR behavior based on data from the study. 
In addition, by discussing the psychological response, the 
authors provided some information as to what miners might 
expect from themselves and how to cope in an escape scenario. 
There have been few studies in the mining industry on how to 
prepare oneself for emergencies. Yet, it is logical to assume 
that what is known about physical and psychological responses 
to traumatic incidents can be incorporated into a coping 
strategy that can be applied for the purpose of escape. A well-
formulated strategy may help the individual think beforehand 
what he or she is likely to face in an actual emergency. 
The question is then what part does the above advice play 
in building a strategy useful in preparing an individual to face 
a situation he or she has probably never faced before? After 
all, the tips appear innocuous. The answer is that these tips 
make up a type of advance organizer, one which links existing 
knowledge to that which is unknown.(17) Whereas there are 
several types of advance organizers, those that provide new 
information to the individual (for example, the fact that SCSRs 
get hot with use) are called expository organizers.(18) Research 
has suggested that expository organizers work best when there 
is no prior knowledge involved, since the advance organizer 
itself becomes the individual’s prior knowledge. Thus, the 
earlier discussion of psychological response, although brief, is 
critically important in developing an effective coping strategy. 
DISCUSSION 
T he integration of expectations training into SCSR training is timely and important in light of the 19 mining fatalities 
in 2006 and the previous studies conducted by NIOSH. 
Researchers conducting interviews in 1988 reported that 
miners did not know how to don their SCSRs and were unaware 
of what to expect from them. For example, miners were not 
aware that the units got hot against the chest and that there 
would be increasing resistance to breathing over time. In 1993, 
a joint government, labor, and industry task group on SCSRs 
concluded that expectations training needed to be introduced 
into emergency training. Studies outside the mining industry 
have concluded that decision making can be affected positively 
in individuals exposed to infrequent, high-impact situations 
if they have had prior experience and training. The mining 
industry may wish to consider realistic, optimistic training that 
has been shown to promote commitment in training, better 
transfer of learning from classroom to work environment, and 
a more positive attitude and motivation to learn. 
The list of expectations developed from this study was given 
to MSHA to meet its urgent need to use this information as part 
of the new mandated SCSR training for teaching miners to 
switch from one SCSR to another in the event they need more 
than one unit to escape. The need for a training regimen for 
switching from one SCSR to a second unit was mandated by the 
Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 
(MINER Act),(19) Because of the urgency to meet the mandates 
of the MINER Act, the authors were operating under severe 
time constraints. They relied, therefore, on their expertise as 
trainers who have extensive knowledge of SCSRs to develop 
a curriculum that they judged to be useful for its intended 
purpose. They then trained a small convenience sample of other 
experts who were in a position to evaluate the content of the 
curriculum, and who found it to be logical and well constructed. 
There was no time to conduct a training field test with a sample 
of miners. However, questions of its applicability are now moot 
because every underground coal miner in the United States 
is trained quarterly using the curriculum developed by the 
authors. 
CONCLUSIONS 
O ver the years there have been repeated calls for SCSR expectations training because a significant number of 
miners who have had to use the devices in an emergency 
maintained that the units did not work. This article presents 
the results of a small study undertaken at the request of MSHA 
to address this issue. 
The authors began by framing the problem historically, then 
focusing on the Sago disaster of 2006, which is illustrative of 
how SCSRs have typically been used and misused by miners 
in emergency situations. The fact that three individuals were 
convinced that their apparatuses were not working undoubtedly 
had some bearing on their decision to return to the workplace 
and barricade after initiating an escape attempt through a mine 
tunnel. 
With these issues as background, the authors next reviewed 
the few relevant studies that address expectations training in 
general. Although scarce, the existing research does indicate 
that prior experience and training influence individuals’ be­
havior during events that occur infrequently but have a high 
consequence—a description that fits mine disasters perfectly. 
The study involved 11 subjects with disparate backgrounds, 
some of whom had worn the SCSR extensively. The aim was 
to develop, as fully as possible, a list of characteristic issues 
relevant to the apparatus when in use. The result was nine key 
concerns that were generally agreed on by the subjects. These, 
combined with an assessment of psychological responses, 
made up the core of a training document that was turned over 
to MSHA for its use. 
The ultimate conclusion for the mining industry from the 
research reported thus far is that expectations training for 
SCSRs is long overdue. There is a pressing need for much 
attention to this issue from both researchers and the industry 
in general. 
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